Stop Yesterday

Stop Yesterday

Is the goal of Israel’s current assault on Gaza to discourage Hamas from firing rockets or to render them incapable of doing so? These are two quite different projects.

I

srael’s stated goal in the assault on Hamas ⁠— to provide peace and quiet for the country’s south ⁠— disturbs me because it’s a political not a military goal. How is quiet to be defined? Quiet like Israel’s north, where Hizballah has tens of thousands of little missiles pointing at the country that could be unleashed at any moment? Or quiet like Middlesex, on nobody’s radar screen? That is to say, is the goal of this assault to discourage Hamas from firing rockets, or is it to render Hamas incapable of firing rockets? These are two very different projects, yet we are hearing about both from the government, which suggests that the government isn’t quite sure.

[Update 2016 Apr 5: In retrospect I’m being foolish here: “quiet” is a nice, ambiguous term. You don’t want to telegraph to the enemy that the goal is in fact merely to degrade, not destroy. (Contrast with the US announcing to the Taliban the precise day they’ll be pulling out…)]

In the more limited scenario, that is, if the military objective is to reinstate deterrence, then Israel could have stopped after the first two shocking days, before the international community had a chance to scramble back to its usual narrative configuration (images of wide-eyed Palestinian rock-throwing schoolchildren juxtaposed with faceless Israeli tanks, etc). The punishment met out would have served as a sufficiently ample invitation to Hamas to reconsider its rocket-firing habit.

If however the objective is to remove the threat, then the only way to do so is to uproot Hamas completely, which seems infeasible. Even if the IDF were to storm Gaza, conquer it, capture and imprison the Hamas leadership and invite the Palestinian Authority back in to govern, there would still be dozens of splinter cells able and willing to fire rockets.

In short, the only feasible military objective, it seems to me, is to inflict some harsher punishment on Hamas for the rocket-firing than merely closing the border (which, to my mind, is not punishment anyway but rather an appropriate situation between hostile parties). Such punishment was achieved in the first two shocking days.

So Israel should already have stopped in order to observe and reassess. There’s no need to discuss a negotiated ceasefire nor wait as the international pressure mounts. Stop yesterday. And if the rockets nonetheless continue, resume tomorrow.

PS ⁠— The only way for the larger project to be viable, it seems to me, is if it’s in partnership with Egypt ⁠— that is to say, if Israel and Egypt have made a deal that if Israel degrades Hamas sufficiently, Egypt will step in and effectively govern Gaza.

Mubarak has alluded to this, as has been reported extensively, by saying that he’ll only open Egypt’s border with Gaza once the Palestinian Authority is back in power. Such an arrangement seems to me an appropriate long-term strategic political goal, but at this stage it seems merely a fantasy.

Update: Herb Keinon, chief diplomatic correspondent for The Jerusalem Post, argues in “The Gaza operation’s unstated goal: Anarchy” that Israel is pursuing a third way, a middle way: degrade Hamas’s ability to govern sufficiently so that it loses control of Gaza. This seems a very flimsy war aim and ultimately implausible.

The Trail

Wednesday, June 17th, 2026

Amit Segal, longer than usual for his It’s Noon in Israel newsletter, posits the perennial faultline in Israel politics: Jewish vs Israeli.

“Jewish” and “Israeli” are simply the two tenets of Israel’s self-definition as a Jewish and democratic state ⁠— not in open contradiction, since most Israelis hold both, but forever rubbing against each other. Like asking whether strawberry-banana yogurt is more strawberry or banana, Israelis are endlessly asked, in one disguise or another, whether they are slightly more Jewish than democratic or the reverse. Once you see it, most of the news in the country ⁠— most push notifications, most studio shouting matches ⁠— dissolves into that same question, with a thin veneer of fresh event on top.

Segal himself straddles the divide nicely, as does the society writ large, part and parcel of the fading Ashkenazi/Sephardi divide. In my thin slice of observation, secular Israelis who delight in eating swine abroad now light candles and recite more complete prayers at home for Friday night dinner than they used to ⁠— indeed holding Friday night dinner itself is the gateway. And there are so many gateways.

I do however take issue with Amit’s characterization of the Israeli/left side:

Of course we are Jewish, the left answers ⁠— the flag is essentially a prayer shawl, the emblem is the Temple menorah, every kindergartner comes home Friday with a challah ⁠— but that is the décor, not the purpose; the purpose is to be the only democracy in the Middle East.

Instead, it seems to me that people on this side, those of the “villa in the jungle” view, would rather just forget about the jungle; being “the only X in the Middle East” is merely apologetics, not identity. Rather, it’s about being a liberal democracy simply because that is the enlightened, obvious, natural thing to be; anyone with a Yiddisher kopf can see that. And as for the Right downgrading democracy to merely being the operating system, well, that’s what Judaism itself arguably is too, so being the OS is no small thing.

I don’t go to synagogue but the synagogue that I don’t go to is Orthodox.

David Ben-Gurion

Friday, June 12th, 2026

Francesco Parrino is getting the Benny and Björn spirit of things here with his piano cover of Super Trouper, probably my favorite ABBA song ⁠— though like with other covers of his I’ve listened to, I enjoy the first half of the track more than the second.